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Patriots all around: inter/national timing, round numbers, and the politics of 
commemorative critique 
 
Andrew R. Hom 
University of Edinburgh 
 
<<Forthcoming in the Australian Journal of Politics and History (2018)>> 
 
Introduction  
Does it matter when we say what we say? Rather than focusing on a particular 
commemoration, I want to draw attention to the broader issue of what we do when we discuss 
centenaries and other ‘big’ anniversaries. I contend that regardless of whether we 
congratulate or criticize, such occasions remain captured within a hegemonic politics of 
commemoration. By choosing the anniversaries of internationally important events, 
especially round anniversaries (10th, 25th, 50th, centenary), even the staunchest critics of the 
state and states’ system affirm state-centric timing orders by rendering particular happenings 
as ‘historical events’ and imbuing them with cosmopolitical value. Even when we take 
anniversaries as an opportunity to develop withering critiques of the statist status quo, as 
many in this special issue do,1 we still reproduce nation-states, their relations, and the states 
system as the real and central elements of global politics. In terms of timing, centenary critics 
are patriots and internationalists too.  
 
To defend this position, the article shows how calendrical commemoration reproduces a 
statist and internationalist (henceforth, “inter/national”) timing regime.2 First, I briefly 
present a theory of timing, which shows how shared conceptions of time spring from and 
depend upon particular standards of orientation and control. I then use timing to highlight the 
inner workings and implications of any discussion indexed to inter/national calendars. In the 
second section, I summarize links between hegemonic timing and the modern inter/national. 
In the third, I explicate the cosmopolitical importance of calendars, showing how modern 
dating systems constitute ‘historical time’, privilege particular legacies, produce collective 
identities at the national-state and international levels, and amplify the importance of round 
                                                 
1 E.g. see Auchter, Barder, McDonald, Omelicheva, and Subotic, this issue. 
2 I use inter/national to avoid the cumbersome phrase ‘statist and internationalist’. ‘Inter/national’ also 
builds on critiques of the state-centrism of traditional IR by highlighting how calendars undergird the modern 
states system.  
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numbers. Fourth, I discuss the ontopolitics of these timing practices and identify five 
consequences of inter/nationally-timed critique. To conclude, I suggest alternative calendars 
supportive of a more thoroughgoing challenge to our hegemonic, inter/national politics of 
commemoration.  
 
Timing and dating  
In order to unpack what fans and critics alike are doing when they observe anniversaries, it 
helps to think about timing instead of time. As discussed elsewhere,3 this seemingly simple 
shift from noun to verb houses important theoretical implications for understanding temporal 
phenomena. Nouns are naturally “substantival” and thus easily objectified and reified.4 
Through repetition they can take on a life of their own, which separates them from human 
ideas and effort. Verbs, on the other hand, keep our attention trained on actions and practices 
undertaken by social agents. This is especially the case in time studies, where even the most 
incisive analyses of time and temporality5 have the effect of “thingifying” or naturalizing 
time and temporality as a dimension, force, or some entity separate from human activity. So 
although time scholars often acknowledge that humans construct and experience time 
differently, this way of discussing it reproduces a time of the universe or some other 
objective and independent entity superseding temporal experience.  
 
This sort of reification of time abets the intuitive appeal of anniversary critiques. It makes it 
seem as if 2018 “really is” approaching,6 so the only option for critically-minded scholars is 
to take it – the seemingly natural turning of the year – as an occasion to challenge hegemonic 
interpretations of what 2017 or its big events mean. A theory of timing clarifies just what we 
accomplish in such instances.  
  
                                                 
3 Andrew R. Hom, “Angst Springs Eternal: Dangerous Times and the Dangers of Timing the ‘Arab 
Spring,’” Security Dialogue 47, no. 2 (April 1, 2016): 168–70; Andrew R. Hom, “Reckoning Ruin: International 
Relations and the Problem of Time” (Book manuscript in preparation, Edinburgh, 2017) chp. 1. 
4 Norbert Elias, An Essay on Time (Dublin: University College Dublin Press, 2007), 54. 
5 e.g. Kimberly Hutchings, Time and World Politics: Thinking the Present (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2008); Ty Solomon, “Time and Subjectivity in World Politics,” International Studies 
Quarterly 58, no. 4 (2014): 671–81; Christopher McIntosh, “Theory across Time: The Privileging of Time-Less 
Theory in International Relations,” International Theory 7, no. 03 (November 2015): 464–500; Tim Stevens, 
Cyber Security and the Politics of Time (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
6 McIntosh, “Theory across Time,” 470. Reification is a matter of practice and degree; e.g. Omelicheva 
(2018, this issue) notes that Russian legislators miscalculated the date of Moscow’s November 1612 liberation 
when translating it from Julian to Gregorian calendars. 
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“Timing” here includes much more than our idiomatic references to coincidences – e.g. the 
way we exclaim “nice timing!” when running into a friend unexpectedly. It is also much 
more than the kairotic idea of a “moment” of opportunity or a sense of when to take a 
specific action.7 Rather, pace the sociologist Norbert Elias,8 timing refers to a robust and 
synoptic vision constructed and enacted by social agents. It includes ideas about which 
changes matter, what they mean, how they fit together, and how they might unfold. It focuses 
not only on the occurrence of a particular change but also on the more substantial continuum 
or continua of changes in which it is embedded. Timing is a basic means of grappling with 
the intrinsic differences and dynamics of life, a way of synthesizing multiple changes into a 
coherent, animated whole. This synthesis helps us orient ourselves, establish relations, and 
exert self-control as well as control over others.9 
  
Reflective of our “basic capacity for establishing relationships,”10 timing proceeds by 
reference to some master organizing principle or timing standard. This standard instructs how 
to integrate and co-ordinate change continua so they unfold in ways conducive to our 
overarching objective. Timing thus always involves subordination inasmuch as we choose 
one timing standard instead of others and use it to gather together and arrange change 
continua that would otherwise proceed differently. Timing thus always expresses a will to 
time not unlike Nietzsche’s will to power, understood as a “vision of order” or “an ultimate 
explanatory principle for whatever there might be” enabling action and imagining our 
environment as a meaningful “unity and totality.”11 Every timing scheme therefore reflects 
particular interests and purposes.12  
 
Moving from initial efforts to synthesize unruly changes to a widely deployed timing regime 
marks a shift from active to passive timing. Active timing involves self-conscious reflection 
about the timing standard and negotiations how to use it to synthesize change continua. In 
passive timing, the standard and its consequent modes of synthesis have been widely 
                                                 
7 Hutchings, Time and World Politics; Tom Lundborg, Politics of the Event: Time, Movement, 
Becoming (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011); Stevens, Cyber Security, 71–72. 
8 Elias, An Essay on Time. 
9 As discussed below and implied in Subotic’s (2018) contribution to this issue, this brings together 
calendrical commemoration and issues of identity formation and in/security. 
10 Elias, An Essay on Time, 38. 
11 Ulrik Enemark Petersen, “Breathing Nietzsche’s Air: New Reflections on Morgenthau’s Concepts of 
Power and Human Nature,” Alternatives 24, no. 1 (1999): 94–95; Hom, “Reckoning Ruin” chp. 1. 
12 Andrew R. Hom, “Timing Is Everything: Toward a Better Understanding of Time and International 
Politics” (Article manuscript, Edinburgh, 2017), 10. 
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accepted and/or institutionalized and, as a result, are rarely acknowledged as such. In passive 
timing, we do not think much about what we are doing (or what we might do otherwise), we 
simply use a working timing mode to organize our lives. Yet both active and passive timing 
actualize political power by selecting and directing change continua into particular pathways. 
Active timing actualizes a will to time by putting into practice a particular vision of how 
processes unfold. Passive timing embeds that will within routinized practices and structural 
constraints, reinforcing its apparent intuitiveness and inhibiting alternatives.13 Here reflection 
on different timing possibilities is necessary but not sufficient to challenge the dominant, 
passive, timing regime.  
 
By invoking co-ordination and a timing standard, it may seem as if my theory of timing refers 
primarily to enumerated “times” like the standardized clock and the Gregorian calendar. 
While timing does pertain to these stalwarts, it also accommodates more flexible, narrative 
modes like history14 and national autobiographies15 that privilege some changes over others 
and “emplot” a continuum according to some theme. And when successful and iterative, both 
types of timing – enumerative and narrative – can produce discursive references to “time” or 
“temporality”. This is how timing explains “time” per se, as nothing more than our symbolic 
reference to underlying timing activities. “Time” is not a dimension, force, or thing; it is an 
artifact of social timing efforts and their linguistic descriptors. Turning this point around, 
every instance of “time” or temporality indicates a particular, underlying timing practice. 
Time utterances thus mark an opportunity to unpack synthetic order by identifying its 
overarching standard; its modes of synthesis, orientation, and control; and what “will” it 
actualizes. Where calendars and commemoration are concerned, we can ask what timing 
regime produces and is reinforced by a particular anniversary. 
 
Timing the nation-state 
Various scholars have sketched important links between time and the rise of the nation-
state.16 States arose as solutions to the “secular humanist moment,”17 when “the temporal” 
                                                 
13 Elias, An Essay on Time, 41–43; Hom, “Timing Is Everything,” 7–10. 
14 Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, Volume 3, ed. David Pellauer (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1988). 
15 Brent J. Steele, Ontological Security in International Relations: Self-Identity and the IR State 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2008). 
16 Stephen Kern, The Culture of Time and Space: 1880-1918 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1983), 19; Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, Volume 3, 105; Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: 
Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, Revised (London: Verso, 1991); Elias, An Essay on Time, 
45–46; Paulina Ochoa Espejo, The Time of Popular Sovereignty: Process and the Democratic State (University 
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realm became no longer merely a sinful interlude between biblical Fall and Redemption, but 
itself a meaningful, self-contained span – a “meanwhile” in which “coincidence” becomes 
“contemporaneity” and a collective identity can emerge.18 Importantly, this moment retained 
the religious view of time per se as a problem – either vulnerable to Fortuna or a natural 
source of discord and chaos.19 Without God’s promise to deliver humanity “in the fullness of 
time” and redeem time itself with eternity, modern states alone must “solve […] problems 
most fundamentally, of temporality” – usually understood as ensuring survival and keeping 
chaos at bay.20 
 
Viable states signaled their mastery over time by shaping the ever-more precise, standardized 
clocks and the Gregorian calendar to their purposes. France’s Constitution Nationale 
announced “a new world-era with the Year One, starting from the abolition of the ancien 
regime and the proclamation of the Republic on 22 September 1792.”21 Accurate mass-
produced clocks and Americanized almanacs played key roles in establishing a distinctly 
“nationalist idiom”22 in the young United States (US). Von Moltke complained that five 
conflicting time zones were “debris left over from the era of a splintered Germany”, which 
“should be removed now that we are an empire.”23 And Stalin proposed the nepreryvka, or 
“uninterrupted” work week, in order to maximize production capabilities with a distinctly 
Soviet calendar.24  
 
These modifications in timing societal life helped subjects of Louis XVI become republican 
French citizens, colonial settlers united Americans, Prussians and Saxons German, and 
                                                                                                                                                       
Park, Pa.: Penn State University Press, 2011); Kathleen Davis, Periodization and Sovereignty: How Ideas of 
Feudalism and Secularization Govern the Politics of Time (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012). 
17 J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic 
Republican Tradition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016). 
18 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 24. 
19 Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment; Hom, “Angst Springs Eternal,” 170–73. 
20 Thomas M. Allen, A Republic in Time: Temporality and Social Imagination in Nineteenth-Century 
America (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2008), 4–5. I develop a fuller account of the 
problem of time in Hom, “Reckoning Ruin” Introduction. 
21 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 193. The French also attempted, unsuccessfully, to institute the 
decade, a ten-day week reflecting their metric system Eviatar Zerubavel, The Seven Day Circle: The History 
and Meaning of the Week (New York: The Free Press, 1985), 28–35. 
22 Allen, A Republic in Time, 1–3. 
23 Quoted in Ian Bartky, One Time Fits All: The Campaigns for Global Uniformity (Stanford University 
Press, 2007), 123; see Andrew R. Hom, “Hegemonic Metronome: The Ascendancy of Western Standard Time,” 
Review of International Studies 36, no. 4 (2010): 1163. 
24 Zerubavel, Seven Day Circle, 35–43. Because it disrupted family leisure time, this was one of his 
least successful reforms. Omelicheva (2018, this issue) covers another instance of calendrical reform in Russia. 
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Russians Soviet comrades.25 National timing was clearly a matter of sovereignty with 
international political consequences. When the US purchased Alaska from Russia, the change 
in sovereignty also meant the territory’s calendar switched from eastern/Julian to 
western/Gregorian dating – a swing of twelve days.26 When the United Kingdom (UK) 
proposed Greenwich as the prime meridian of twenty-four global time zones constituting the 
‘international’ as a single global space,27 Americans called it an affront to their sovereignty 
that imposed “English time” on the US.28 The French initially insisted the US and the UK 
adopt France’s own national treasure, the metric system.29  
 
Calendar cosmopolis 
Why did setting the time matter so much? Because the “mastery of time” was understood to 
mark a key instance of human discovery and further to provide “an index of the progress of 
civilization”.30 To understand why and how these instruments help states to time their 
identities,31 it helps to look more closely at how modern clocks and calendars function in 
social life.  
 
The modern, Gregorian calendar emerged from medieval ecclesiastical debates where 
attempts to “compute” an exact date – even for purely practical purposes – risked heresy if 
they contradicted papal dating schemes. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, historians 
began to sidestep such dangers by focusing less on exact dates and more on qualitative 
“fluctuation[s] of triumphs and tribulations between the unmastered past and the uncertain 
future.”32 In other words, history and historiography provided a way to orient and 
contextualize present experience in a chronology without resorting to thorny theological 
issues of time reckoning. Although computation disputes eventually quieted down, the 
modern calendar henceforth co-mingled dates with narrative and collective memory, 
enumerating “natural cycles” while charting “high points of human endeavor” as “landmarks 
                                                 
25 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 193. 
26 Bartky, One Time Fits All, 23–24. 
27 On the constitution of the international, see Jens Bartelson, Visions of World Community 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
28 Hom, “Hegemonic Metronome,” 1163. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Allen, A Republic in Time, 1–2. 
31 Andrew R. Hom and Ty Solomon, “Timing, Identity, and Emotion in International Relations,” in 
Time, Temporality, and Global Politics, ed. Andrew R. Hom et al. (Bristol, UK: e-International Relations, 
2016), 20–37. 
32 Arno Borst, The Ordering of Time: From the Ancient Computus to the Modern Computer (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1993), 72. 
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for historical thought. In short, [it] constituted historical time” as a new way to “form [...] 
relationships between people.”33 In the modern calendar, national heroism now evoked a 
deeper religious and mythological heritage in which “special days and seasons” marked the 
“interruption” of ordinary life by a deity.34 So although much more secular in content, 
modern calendars functionally recover a mythological and “‘spasmodic’” quality of timing 
enabling remembered “heroes” to “live years of magical life” in a much smaller calendrical 
span.35  
 
Our modern calendar thereby supports the nation-state. Its abstract, comparatively precise, 
and qualitatively flexible dating scheme readily accommodate inter/nationalist imaginaries, 
enshrining some idiographic events as historical and worthy of commemoration while 
marginalizing others. 1776 and 1792 become years ‘one’ of the American and French 
republics; 1 September 2004, 7/7, and 26 November 2008 become dates of Russian, British, 
and Indian resilience impelling the Global War on Terror; and 11:00 on 11 November marks 
the end of the Great War between the great powers of early twentieth-century international 
politics.36  
 
Familiarity with such inter/national dates may obscure the capacity of those dates to re-time 
political life and collective memory. They signify “formation stories” (McCourt, this issue) 
that synthesize, orient, and direct human collectives as nation-states and members of an 
international system. This is why claims about ‘year zero’ or the ‘dawn of a new era’ are so 
important to inter/national politics. They designate an “axial moment”, “the upsurge of the 
act [...] that makes possible the whole enterprise and therefore also its beginning in time.”37 
They also legitimate an “official system of dating” and “perennialization resulting from the 
series of ritual reenactments”, evoking our long history of “rites, feasts, and public 
ceremonies.”38 Once again, although secular in content, perennialization taps into a timing 
power as old as myth. Because they locate human experiences on a grid inspired by celestial 
motion, calendars bridge “lived and universal time”, applying an inter/national frame of 
reference to ‘“tell us in the proper sense of the term where we are in the vast reaches of 
                                                 
33 Ibid., 105, 73. 
34 Kern, Culture of Time and Space, 32. 
35 Ibid.; see also Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, Volume 3. 
36 On the ‘greatness’ of the Great War, see Auchter (2018, this issue). 
37 Paul Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting, New edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2004), 105, 139. O’Driscoll and McDonald (this issue) analyze other axial moments based on tragedies. 
38 Ibid., 139. 
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history, what our place is in the infinite succession of human beings who have lived and of 
things that have happened.”’39  
 
Perennialized timing also gives political authorities “anchor points” to which they can refer 
and call “ahead of time”40 the civic observances constituting ‘us’ as a political collective and 
providing a comprehensive grid for daily life and inter/national consciousness, the latter of 
which is unimaginable without 1648, 1776, 1914, 1989, 9/11. Such dates outline a “symbolic 
universe” ordering experience and linking individuals “with their predecessors and their 
successors in a meaningful totality”, helps “transcend the finitude of individual existence”, 
and constitutes human experience as “belonging to a meaningful universe”.41 The full effect 
is to “transpose” some empirical grouping “onto a cosmic plan” that, once again, keeps 
“chaos at bay.”42 Observing these dates re-institutionalizes the inter/national every time. 
 
The cosmopolitics of round numbers 
Because they combine elements of progression and recurrence (years accumulate via the 
cycling of days, weeks, and months), calendars also possess an epistemological potency 
related to our preference round numbers. They count off or measure all other time from axial 
moments, with round quantities taking precedence. France might commemorate its revolution 
each year, but “the major commemoration”43 of living memory occurred in 1993 because it 
marked the 200th anniversary, which is more significant than the 199th or 201st. Likewise, 
Americans born in 1976 are ‘bicentennial babies’;44 those born in 1975 or ’77 received no 
such patriotic designations.45  
 
Although every anniversary perennializes the national biography a little bit more and helps 
divide daily and historical life into “sectors that are apprehended routinely,”46 round 
anniversaries epitomize the comforting regularity of rationalized public time in two ways. 
                                                 
39 Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, Volume 3, 105. 
40 Ibid., 108. 
41 Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality (Garden City, NY: 
Doubleday, 1966), 103. 
42 Ibid., 103, also 42. 
43 François Hartog, Regimes of Historicity: Presentism and Experiences of Time, trans. Saskia Brown 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), 120. 
44 E.g. see Steele’s (2018) introduction to this issue. 
45 Elsewhere, musical albums go gold and platinum upon selling 500,000 and 1M copies, respectively. 
In ice hockey it is a career-defining achievement to score 50 goals in 50 games, 49 in 49 counts as ‘falling just 
short’. 
46 Berger and Luckmann, Social Construction, 24; Kern, Culture of Time and Space, 14. 
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First, roundness aids approximations and the mitigation of the existential flux. Roundness 
refers to integers ending in one or more zeros. Between two numbers of equivalent 
magnitude, the one ending in more zeros is rounder: 1000 CE is rounder than 997 CE but also 
than 1002 CE.47 Roundness also applies to mid-point integers like 5 – halfway between zero 
integers in a base-10 numbering system.48 Round numbers are thus able to act as 
approximations of more precise and more taxing (in terms of information processing) values. 
We easily gloss 9.7 as ‘around’ 10; ‘a thousand’ frequently subsumes more exact values like 
997 or 1013. Round numbers enable all sorts of ad hoc negotiations in daily life; the larger 
their magnitude, the wider the range of precise values they accommodate. Five approximates 
a range of +/- two, otherwise we would round up to ten or down to zero. But 1000 might 
approximate a range as wide as +/- 499.  
 
So it goes with timing. Consider two answers to the question, ‘what time is it?’: 1) 12:57:39; 
or 2) ‘about one o’clock’.  For most purposes, the latter is more useful because a) it requires 
less information processing, and; b) it subsumes a wider range of more precise times.49 Over 
multiple iterations, it also imbues life with regularity: ‘I eat lunch at 12:30 each day’ glosses 
the fact that one day I eat at 12:29:59, the next 12:31:08, and the next 12:34:43, thus lending 
my lunches a sense of habit and routine. 
 
Second, round shorthands can influence timing in a more robust way via institutionalized 
calendars. What begins as approximation “thickens” and “hardens” through repeated use, 
transforming ad hocery into an anchor point for daily and inter/national life.50 Inasmuch as 
they sit in-between and subsume more cumbersome values, thereby enabling habituation, 
round numbers partake of the modern episteme’s fancy for means, norms, and regularity. 
Along with helping a dispersed collection of people to cohere as a group, the normative value 
of a regulating average complemented modern time-keeping entrepreneurs’ efforts to sell a 
“mean noon” to various locales that would not actually see the sun directly overhead at that 
moment.51 Although we do not think explicitly about any of this anymore, calendrical dates 
also make use of this regulating norm, collecting distant places with a timing standard that 
                                                 
47 Scott Ferson et al., “Natural Language of Uncertainty,” International Journal of Approximate 
Reasoning 57 (February 1, 2015): 31. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid., 31, 20. 
50 Berger and Luckmann, Social Construction, 59. 
51 See Michael O’Malley, Keeping Watch: A History of American Time (Washington: Smithsonian 
Institution Press, 1990). 
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fixes, more or less arbitrarily when the clock and calendar turn over and when the “social 
timing-unit” in question begins and ends.52 
 
Round anniversaries also reinforce inter/national calendars’ links to a more venerable 
symbolic tradition. Consider the modern century, a round time unit we take entirely for 
granted as a ‘big’ anniversary. Yet this interpretation is only around 450 years old. It arose 
from religious conflicts. In 1559, Protestant historians known as the Magdeburg Centuriators 
established a “new form of great year: the century”, and assigned this “regular, clear interval” 
to each Gospel author in order to contest Papal dating.53 Although intended as a technical 
stop-gap, by designating the century a “great year” Centuriators tapped into an ancient 
cosmopolitics – the idea that human order reflects natural and cosmic truths.54  
 
Traditionally, “great year” refers to a “perfect number” when “time [is] coming round or 
circling” back to some default position.55 For Plato, it marked the return of “wandering 
[celestial] bodies” to their original alignment.56 Great years also evoke the sense of “eternal 
return” so important to the western philosophical tradition, for coming around to default 
helps time symbolize wholeness57 as well as the sense of another turn of the cosmic gears. 
 
The century’s great year heritage lends modern calendars a cosmopolitical edge. By 
combining progression with recurrence and precise dating with historical chronology, they 
chart an “unrepeatable succession of numbered years” whose practical utility is to 
“symbolically represent the unrepeatable succession of social and natural events” and thus 
“serve as a means of orientation in the great continuum of change.”58 Add to this the 
convention of ranking anniversaries by roundness and the calendar also imposes a large-
scale, regular pattern on social life linking inter/national politics to the cosmos. Round 
anniversaries cast the inter/national as both seminal and symbolically eternal – the impulse 
power behind the gears of existence. As a nexus of cosmopolitical, epistemological, and 
                                                 
52 Elias, An Essay on Time, 47. 
53 Borst, Ordering of Time, 103. 
54 See Hom, “Hegemonic Metronome,” 1150–53. 
55 Richard Sorabji, Time, Creation, and the Continuum: Theories in Antiquity and the Early Middle 
Ages (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 184 emph. added. 
56 Quoted in ibid., 182. 
57 Ibid., 107. 
58 Elias, An Essay on Time, 7. 
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practical timing power, it is hard to imagine a more decisive symbol of the nation-state’s 
mastery of temporal flux and chaos.  
 
In these ways, modern calendars quite literally time the nation-state and states system. They 
comprehend and synchronize diverse individuals and their activities;59 they help resolve 
discrepancies and ambiguities;60 thus enabling a unified identity to unfold within their 
smooth-running account of time itself.61 Moreover, their qualitative flexibility allows 
inter/national chronologies to punctuate this clean quotidian flow with commemorative 
reminders of heroic deeds done, existential threats subdued, depravations endured, and crises 
overcome, reproducing the entity as that which confirms reality and prevents its breakdown 
(e.g. see Omelicheva, this issue). 
 
This is an ontopolitical process that privileges a particular interpretation of partial data as 
reality itself by “universalize[ing] the specific and naturalize[ing] the contingent.”62 Social 
order by an inter/national calendar works by “dominant accounts of specific situations” and 
‘“fundamental presumptions that establish the possibilities”’ for apprehending and assessing 
reality.63 Through repeated observances and especially through round anniversaries, it makes 
the time of the calendar seem real and unassailable. The state calendar renders national time 
“absolute” and “true”, something which “of itself, and from its own nature, flows equally 
without relation to anything external.”64 Internationally perennialized dates accomplish the 
same effect one level up, stitching together atomized territories as members of a system, 
society, or community. 
 
The ontopolitics of calendrical commemoration  
We can now answer more fully the question animating this article: what do we actually do 
when we acknowledge an important event on its round anniversary? On such occasions there 
                                                 
59 Ibid., 45. 
60 Bartky, One Time Fits All, 2. 
61 Elias, An Essay on Time, 45–46; Hom and Solomon, “Timing, Identity, and Emotion in International 
Relations,” 25–32; Hom, “Timing Is Everything,” 18–20. 
62 David Campbell, “Beyond Choice: The Onto-Politics of Critique,” International Relations 19, no. 1 
(March 1, 2005): 128, doi:10.1177/0047117805050068. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Newton, quoted in Kern, Culture of Time and Space, 11. Calendars are more ontopolitical than our 
standardized clocks: years/months/days reflect celestial motion, whereas hours/minutes/seconds are thought 
more artificial cf. Tim Stevens, “Governing the Time of the World,” in Time, Temporality, and Global Politics, 
ed. Andrew R. Hom et al. (Bristol, UK: e-International Relations, 2016). See Subotic (2018, this issue) for a 
discussion of round anniversaries and ontological security. 
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are important differences between those who valorize and those who dissent – recalling  9/11 
as a day when “we” were attacked simply for “our way of life”65 is not the same as exploring 
its structural drivers. Yet in both instances, the inter/national calendar provides the occasion – 
‘the reason’ and ‘the time at which’ it is appropriate for us to either speak triumph or 
tribulation, to laud or loathe, to proclaim or declaim. In the words of one great nationalist-
poet, both approaches “let the nation get in our way.”66 
 
Both approaches further reaffirm states’ authority to time their inhabitants as inter/national 
citizens. Regardless of the content of commemoration, indexing it to national holidays 
confirms a hegemonic timing regime. Round anniversaries strengthen this process by 
positioning the inter/national as the cosmopolitical source of great years and thereby the 
natural order of existence. Even when we challenge the nation-state on its own holidays or 
anniversaries, we still institutionalize or pass on those dates as politically more important 
than all others and as the practical anchors of our annual routines of work, leisure, collective 
memory, and inter/national identity. This “crystallizes” the inter/national timing grid, making 
it ever more “plausible” and “massive” – something “over and beyond” individuals that 
confronts them “as an external and coercive fact.”67 More succinctly, we contribute to a 
passive regime expressive of an inter/national will to time and bound up with all sorts of 
structural incentives and constraints – from work, leisure, and family opportunities; to 
normative associations about timeliness, morality, and good citizenship;68 to respect for dates 
that reflect specific political identities and ideologies. The complete ontopolitical success of 
this regime resolves when it becomes entirely uncontroversial to refer to inter/national 
calendars as examples of “modern time givers” that “acquire and maintain the correct time”69 
rather than producing and instituting a contestable mode of synthesis. In terms of timing and 





                                                 
65 “A DAY OF TERROR; Bush’s Remarks to the Nation on the Terrorist Attacks,” The New York 
Times, September 12, 2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/12/us/a-day-of-terror-bush-s-remarks-to-the-
nation-on-the-terrorist-attacks.html. 
66 Gordon Downie et al., Fireworks (Phantom Power (Fontana Universal), 1998). 
67 Berger and Luckmann, Social Construction, 58–49, 154. 
68 O’Malley, Keeping Watch, 1–55. 
69 Bartky, One Time Fits All, xiii emph. added. 
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Five consequences of temporal patriotism 
Inter/national timing has five consequences:  
 
1. It subordinates other moments and experiences. The ‘birth’ of sovereign states in 
1648 obscures 1647 and ’49; 1913 is a mere prelude to the Great War;70 barrels more 
ink has been spilt on 1945 than 1946; and the Y2K millennialism of 2000 was 
forgotten in the wake of 9/11. Inter/national timing silences politics in other times and 
thus buttresses deliberate efforts by states to set the rhythm of political life in one way 
and not another by constructing happenings as ‘national events’ elevated over other 
phenomena. Even when lambasting these events, critics reaffirm their political import 
and status as the punctuations requiring our attention. 
 
2. It reinforces an elitist symbolic hierarchy. Inter/nationally-timed critique does not 
admit small or fleeting events – a single atrocity or some other micropolitical act71 – 
as worthy of attention. Stalin was said to distinguish between the tragedy of a single 
death and the statistic of a million. Except for political elites, inter/national calendars 
are metronomes set to Stalinist statistics: the wholesale slaughter of the Great War, 
the Greatest Generation of WWII, the fall of the Berlin Wall. These drown out 
smaller-scaled but no less political events: public lynchings in the American South, 
domestic and sexual violence, and everyday resistance and collaboration. They also 
inhibit us from seeing the global in the local and vice versa. 
 
3. It encourages cognitive and aesthetic attachment to order and routine. It suggests that 
worthwhile experiences follow a regularized schedule. For example, it bids us to wait 
until ‘the major’ commemorative occasion to say something important about the past. 
The current special issue might have to work harder to provide a compelling rationale 
– and could not be called “Centenary International” – if it were pitched in 2013 or 
’18, even though little about the Great War will likely change within this span.72 Thus 
                                                 
70 Although see Auchter (2018, this issue) for a discussion of how the Great War has been 
overshadowed by other wars in American collective memory, most notably WWII. 
71 See Ty Solomon and Brent J. Steele, “Micro-Moves in International Relations Theory,” European 
Journal of International Relations, March 7, 2016, 1354066116634442, doi:10.1177/1354066116634442. 
72 Similarly, in 2009 my graduate home, Aberystwyth International Politics (‘the world’s first’, see 
McCourt, this issue), was accused by frenemies of staging a centenary-style celebration prematurely, on its 90th 
birthday. 
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do we buttress a timing scheme based on routine and regularity, pacifying bodies 
politic and stabilizing their interactions. Calendrical timing is an exercise in 
Gramscian hegemony – most citizens do not notice the timing choices they embody 
every day because these choices imbue life with a sense of order and security, yet 
over countless iterations these choices also co-opt citizens in an inter/national 
ontopolitics of the status quo. 
 
4. It privileges an “eventful” temporality.73 We focus attention on discrete happenings 
with clean beginnings and endings, reinforcing chronologies of heroic deeds and 
masking ongoing, dynamic processes. Structural inequalities and, increasingly, 
political violence do not so much start and stop as emerge, fizzle, and return. For 
example, calendrical timing complements traditional notions of military victory and 
decisive event. For example, 2 September’s VJ Day highlights the discrete moment 
when Japan signed surrender documents aboard the USS Missouri. By contrast, the 
global war on terror may have a conventionalized beginning in 9/11 but it is unlikely 
to end at all, much less to result in a decisive victory. Instead we are left to 
commemorate the assassination of Osama bin-Laden, the “end” of major combat 
operations in Iraq, and the last withdrawal of US troops from Iraq some eight years 
later (nearly a round decade!). Inter/national calendars have few options for timing a 
forever war. 
 
5. Together these consequences re-valorize the ability of inter/national actors to time 
civic and political life. They order individuals’ relationship to the state and states’ 
relations with each other in a particular and rigid way, constituting some agents as 
members of the state and states system, leaving others (most) on the margins. 
Commemorating the Great War recalls particular states as Great Powers but leaves 
most of the world out of the story of the First World War.  
 
Conclusion: alternative calendars of critique 
Deep links between inter/national timing regimes and modern habits of commemoration 
leave critics of the state and international system in a quandary. We cannot ignore the 
importance of dissent on occasions when others call forth heroic chronologies and the 
                                                 
73 Lundborg, Politics of the Event; McIntosh, “Theory across Time,” 489–95; Stevens, Cyber Security, 
40–41. 
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temporal status quo of international relations. Yet this article has found patriotism and 
internationalism formally embedded in our habits of critique. Dissent-by-calendar still 
submits to the timing regime of its target. What, then, can reflexive critique do differently to 
resist inter/national timing orders? 
 
We need better resources to challenge the ontopolitical closures achieved by institutionalized 
calendars. As a first step, I conclude by sketching four alternative calendars that might re-
activate the timing question in political commemoration. These alternatives correspond 
roughly to the first four consequences of inter/nationalist timing just discussed.  
 
1. Commemorate other dates 
We can retrofit inter/national calendars by commemorating other dates to inscribe 
well-known events in a different chronological and narrative arc. Perennialize 1915 or 
1918 instead of 1914 or ’17 and move from focusing on the Great War itself to its role 
in genocide (Barder, this issue) and global pandemic (Youde, this issue). Observe 
1946 instead of 1945 and shift from victory in Europe to victors and vanquished alike 
crippled by war. Commemorate 12 September 2001, after the World Trade Center and 
Pentagon attacks but before an official narrative resolved, and recover the uncertainty 
and diverging interpretations about “what just happened.”74  
 
2. A micropolitical calendar 
We can revise inter/national chronologies more thoroughly by constructing calendars 
of micropolitical events not normally attributed inter/national relevance. For one 
possible example, many police forces and domestic violence support services 
highlight increased incidents during the winter holidays.75 This phenomenon results in 
part from economic stressors. However, the very ability of the state to call a national 
holy day, when many businesses and public spaces close, contributes to this spike: 
“During the holidays, people are home together more [...] In families where there is 
                                                 
74 Lundborg, Politics of the Event. This option depends on the dates and ‘historical’ content chosen and 
is thus not immune to inter/national cooptation, as shown by Omelicheva’s discussion of Russian dating 
adjustments (2018, this issue). 
75 E.g. Police Scotland, see <http://www.edinburghnews.scotsman.com/news/crime/police-launch-




violence present that means more opportunity for violence.”76 To add insult to injury, 
the calendrical significance of the holiday encourages delayed or no reporting: “A lot 
of women will grin and bear it, try to keep the peace so their children don’t have to 
spend holidays in a shelter”.77 Hotline calls spike as soon as the holiday is over. 
 
 Rather than allowing 25 December to read exclusively as Christmas Day, we can 














Figure 1: Standard calendar for 2016 holiday season in the UK 
 


















<<< Domestic violence peak period >>> 
Domestic abuse is never acceptable. Don’t turn a blind eye – speak up, reach out, get help. You are not 
alone! 
(Support hotline: 000-000-0000) 
Figure 2: Micropolitical calendar for 2016 holiday season in the UK 
 
This revision is far from Christmas cheery. But it recovers the fact that while 
domestic violence typically connotes violence within the home, inter/national 
calendars inflect the timetable of abuse. There is little holy about inter/nationally-
mandated holidays for those who keep silent so that their children might experience 
the wonder of ‘the season’. Acknowledging this cruel, state-mandated irony and 
placing resources for those who experience abuse directly on the common calendar is 
one small way to mitigate an annual, holy tragedy.  
 








3. A different mode of synthesis: Process-oriented calendars 
We can also construct calendars without smaller temporal divisions like days and 
weeks in order to open up alternative chronologies too easily obscured by standard 
timing units. This removes barriers to perennializing and reflecting on long-term 
processes – income distribution and wealth inequality, the ‘glocal’ diffusion of 
firearms, voter enfranchisement and suppression, for example. 2017 will mark the 70th 
birthday of the world’s deadliest small arm, the AK-47. Currently, there are more than 
75M in circulation around the world. Why not a calendar commemorating the unholy-
day of the AK-47’s ‘birth’, joined by monthly markers for distribution ‘milestones’ – 
e.g. the provisioning of the Soviet military and each million distributed to other 
locales, or the months when manufacture hit 25M, 50M, and 75M weapons. Why not 
replace ‘31 December’ at the end of the calendar with ‘another 200,000-400,000 
people killed by small arms’?78 
 
4. A different timing standard: Planet calendar 
Cutting even more coarsely, we can develop a calendar for the planet instead of any 
particular political entity or system. Instead of numeric computability by celestial 
motion, this would take as its timing standard the thematic story of earth leading up to 
the “anthropocene”.79 In other words, it is less about commemorating alternative dates 
than setting a different dating scheme and scale altogether. The planet calendar might 
chart long-term carbon dioxide levels and ocean temperatures to turn our modern 
preference for the smooth ‘flow’ of time on its head by foregrounding these factors as 
stable-cyclical yet punctuated by ice ages – a significant temporal rupture by human 
standards but a normal component of planetary routines. To further punctuate ideas 
about quotidian order, a planetary calendar could perennialize major extinction events 
in order to put the looming sixth mass extinction80 in perspective. The Late Devonian 
extinction, ca. 375M years ago, nearly extinguished the Trilobite; the End Permian or 
                                                 
78 See <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/11714558/AK-47-Kalashnikov-
The-firearm-which-has-killed-more-people-than-any-other.html>. 
79 I take inspiration from the ‘Planet Politics’ manifesto calling for ‘an alternative thought and process’ 
but focusing only on spatial terms, one of IR’s most dominant categories of thought Anthony Burke et al., 
“Planet Politics: A Manifesto from the End of IR,” Millennium - Journal of International Studies, 2016, 500. 
80 John D. Sutter, “Vanishing: The Extinction Crisis Is Far Worse than You Think,” accessed 
December 18, 2016, http://www.cnn.com/interactive/2016/12/specials/vanishing/. 
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“great dying”, ca. 250M years ago, killed off 96% of species on earth; and the End 
Triassic came ca. 200M years ago.81 Thanks to the power of round numbers, we can 
‘celebrate’ their anniversaries every year for the foreseeable future without violating 
precepts of temporal proximity, but in a way that precludes such anniversaries 
receding from view. This would encourage the sense of a planetary (rather than 
global, international, or national) now requiring very different symbols of collective 
identity than those offered by inter/national calendars afford. If global ecological 
collapse throws up the urgent need for new ideas about where we are,82 then it also 
requires a different sense of when we are. 
 
These alternatives are roughly sketched. The point is not to replace inter/national timing 
regimes in one fell swoop but rather to begin to think about how we might time and 
remember politics differently. Critiquing the state and international system on their own 
calendars is an important practice of resistance but it challenges collective memory without 
upsetting political timing – we choose what to say but not when to speak. Bemoan your 
relationship on your anniversary and you also confirm your marriage. Criticize the state or 
states system on a statist timetable and we still confirm inter/national politics. A more 
thoroughgoing cosmo- and onto-political challenge to the politics of commemoration must 
also be chronopolitical by defying dominant, passive, inter/national timing regimes. 
 
                                                 
81 Viviane Richter, “The Big Five Mass Extinctions,” Cosmos Magazine, accessed December 18, 2016, 
https://cosmosmagazine.com/palaeontology/big-five-extinctions. 
82 Burke et al., “Planet Politics,” 500. 
